How should non-console administrative access be protected?

How should non-console administrative access be protected?

• A. Encrypt non-console administrative access using SSL only.
• B. Encrypt all non-console administrative access using strong cryptography such as SSH, VPN, or TLS.
• C. Do not encrypt non-console administrative access.
• D. Encrypt only console access.

Answer: (B)

Protect remote administrative sessions by ensuring they are encrypted in transit with strong cryptography. Non-console administrative access refers to management performed over the network (not direct physical console), so protecting those sessions prevents eavesdropping, tampering, and credential theft. The best approach is to encrypt all non-console admin access using strong methods such as SSH for remote command access, VPN to create secure tunnels, or TLS for web-based management interfaces. TLS is the modern standard for securing such traffic, and SSH and VPN provide robust, proven means to protect different types of admin sessions. Using SSL alone is outdated and insufficient, and not encrypting non-console access leaves sensitive admin activity exposed. Encrypting only console access misses remote management paths, so that option would fail to protect the actual admin channels used in practice.

Protect remote administrative sessions by ensuring they are encrypted in transit with strong cryptography. Non-console administrative access refers to management performed over the network (not direct physical console), so protecting those sessions prevents eavesdropping, tampering, and credential theft. The best approach is to encrypt all non-console admin access using strong methods such as SSH for remote command access, VPN to create secure tunnels, or TLS for web-based management interfaces. TLS is the modern standard for securing such traffic, and SSH and VPN provide robust, proven means to protect different types of admin sessions. Using SSL alone is outdated and insufficient, and not encrypting non-console access leaves sensitive admin activity exposed. Encrypting only console access misses remote management paths, so that option would fail to protect the actual admin channels used in practice.